6.1261 In logic process and result are equivalent. (Hence the absence of
surprise.)
6.1262 Proof in logic is merely a mechanical expedient to facilitate the
recognition of tautologies in complicated cases.
6.1263 Indeed, it would be altogether too remarkable if a proposition that
had sense could be proved logically from others, and so too could a logical
proposition. It is clear from the start that a logical proof of a
proposition that has sense and a proof in logic must be two entirely
different things.
6.1264 A proposition that has sense states something, which is shown by its
proof to be so. In logic every proposition is the form of a proof. Every
proposition of logic is a modus ponens represented in signs. (And one
cannot express the modus ponens by means of a proposition.)
6.1265 It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that every
proposition is its own proof.
6.127 All the propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the case
that some of them are essentially derived propositions. Every tautology
itself shows that it is a tautology.
6.1271 It is clear that the number of the 'primitive propositions of logic'
is arbitrary, since one could derive logic from a single primitive
proposition, e.g. by simply constructing the logical product of Frege's
primitive propositions. (Frege would perhaps say that we should then no
longer have an immediately self-evident primitive proposition.
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