For if these are considered
superficially, it looks as if the proposition p stood in some kind of
relation to an object A. (And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell,
Moore, etc.) these propositions have actually been construed in this way.)
5.542 It is clear, however, that 'A believes that p', 'A has the thought
p', and 'A says p' are of the form '"p" says p': and this does not involve
a correlation of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts
by means of the correlation of their objects.
5.5421 This shows too that there is no such thing as the soul--the subject,
etc.--as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day.
Indeed a composite soul would no longer be a soul.
5.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A makes the
judgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece
of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)
5.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constituents are
related to one another in such and such a way. This no doubt also explains
why there are two possible ways of seeing the figure as a cube; and all
similar phenomena. For we really see two different facts. (If I look in the
first place at the corners marked a and only glance at the b's, then the
a's appear to be in front, and vice versa).
5.
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