In particular, the Japanese gave out that they
would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact
resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was
known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The
Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the
indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese
demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed
up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese
announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted
the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus
the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious,
because they had been tricked--the former in the belief that it could
yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter
in the belief that the Government would never give way about the
indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots,
furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government--of the
nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the
real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision
of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view;
there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could
not have been made without trickery.
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