It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes
possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing
a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into
provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the
revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was
attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful
working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population
without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in
Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now
favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not
much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty
of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The
Central Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find
the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad
enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But
it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan
without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese
independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find
a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign
assistance.
It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme,
and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of
consolidating his influence.
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