In the majority of cases the generals did not need the services
of an intelligence department, except to determine the whereabouts of the
enemy, for no scouts or patrols could furnish a better account of the
nature of the country in which they were fighting than that which existed
in the minds of the leaders. Under these conditions there was not the
slightest chance for any of the generals falling into a trap laid by the
enemy, but there always were opportunities for leading the enemy into
ambush.
The Boer generals also had the advantage of having excellent maps of the
country in which they were fighting, and by means of these they were
enabled to explain proposed movements to the commandants and field-cornets
who were not familiar with the topography of the land. These maps were
made two years before the war by a corps of experts employed by the
Transvaal Government, and on them was a representation of every foot of
ground in the Transvaal, Free State, Natal, and Cape Colony. A small
elevation near Durban and a spruit near Cape Town were marked as plainly
as a kopje near Pretoria, while the British forts at Durban and Cape Town
were as accurately pictured as the roads that led to them. The Boers had a
map of the environs of Ladysmith which was a hundred times better than
that furnished by the British War Office, yet Ladysmith was the Natal base
of the British army for many years.
The greater part of the credit for the Boers' preparedness must be given
to the late Commandant-General Piet J.
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